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GREAT-POWER INTERVENTIONS MAKE UNO REGULATION IMPERATIVE

FAR-REACHING questions concerning both the nature of intervention and the effectiveness of the UNO machinery have been raised at the first UNO session. The note presented on January 19 to the UNO by Iran, charging Russia with interference in its internal affairs and asking the Security Council to investigate the dispute and recommend appropriate terms of settlement, was followed on January 21 by notes from Russia and the Ukrainian Republic charging Britain with interference in Greece and Indonesia, respectively. All three notes invoked paragraph 1 of Article 35 of the UNO Charter, which provides that any member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly "any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

IRAN DISPUTE AN OLD ISSUE. The dispute brought to the attention of the UNO by Iran is ostensibly between Iran and Russia over the support given by Moscow to the so-called autonomous movement in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan occupied by Russian troops under the Anglo-Russian-Iranian accord of 1942. In reality it represents a deep-seated conflict between Britain and Russia concerning spheres of influence in that strategic and oil-rich country—a conflict which dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. It will be recalled that the Big Three agreed in 1942 to joint occupation of Iran by Allied forces—Russians in the north and Britishers in the south—to safeguard the country from the Axis and to protect the supply line through the Persian Gulf and across Iranian territory over which the United States delivered war materials

to Russia. On December 1, 1943, at the Teheran Conference, the Big Three guaranteed the independence of Iran, and agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn six months after termination of the war which, according to the Iranians, should have been six months after V-E Day, or December 1945. The British expressed willingness to withdraw at that time, but the Russians made it known that they would not leave until March 2, 1946 (six months after V-J Day)—and that is the date now set for the withdrawal of Russian and British troops from Iran, American military personnel having already left the country.

Two days after presentation of the Iranian note Premier Hakimi of Iran resigned, being succeeded by Ahmad Gavam Saltaneh, wealthy landowner with properties in the disputed area of Azerbaijan, who has held important government offices in the past, and is reported to be well-disposed toward all three great powers interested in the country. His appointment led to rumors that Iran might withdraw its appeal to the UNO, and resume direct negotiations with Russia which, according to that note, had previously ended in failure. But the British government, which on January 22 had announced that it would welcome investigation of Russian and Ukrainian charges concerning its activities in Greece and Indonesia, indicated on January 27 that it would oppose withdrawal of the Iranian appeal and that, if Iran resumed negotiations with Russia, it would insist on presentation of a report to the Security Council about the progress and results of these negotiations.

Meanwhile, opinion in Greece on Russia's note seemed to be divided. President Sophoulis declared that British military forces (whose presence is justified by London on the ground that they are needed

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to preserve order and assure free national elections, to be held on March 31) are in that country with the full consent of the Greek government; but Foreign Minister Sophianopoulos, head of the Greek delegation to the UNO, was reported to differ from this view, and chose to return to Athens rather than dispute Russia's charge. The Dutch objected to the Ukrainian note on Indonesia, where British troops were dispatched by order of the Allied command in the Pacific following Japan's surrender; while "Premier" Sjahrir representing Indonesian Nationalists said the British could leave at once if they transferred the task of disarming and evacuating the Japanese to the Nationalists.

COOPERATION FOSTERS INTERVENTION.

What we are witnessing all over the world is the by no means novel intervention of one or other of the great powers in the affairs of those countries which are closest to them geographically or are of special concern to them for strategic, political or economic reasons. Intervention takes a variety of forms—diplomatic suasion, support of a given ideology against another (by the United States in Argentina, by Russia in Rumania and Bulgaria), economic aid conditioned on fulfillment of political or financial requirements (in the case of United States aid to China and Greece), or presence of military forces (in Iran, in Russian-occupied countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, in British-occupied Greece). Wherever it occurs, intervention is invariably justified by the existence of extraordinary circumstances, and is believed by the intervening country—for the most part genuinely—to be in the ultimate interest of the nation on whose territory it occurs.

To contend that no country should ever intervene in the "internal" affairs of another is to disregard the harsh realities of international life. The line between "internal" affairs and their external results is growing increasingly tenuous, as we have seen, to give only two examples, from our experience with Germany and, most recently, Argentina. By the time Germany invaded Poland it was generally admitted that the Nazi system had become a menace to other

countries. Yet during the preceding six years when that system was consolidating itself in full view of the world, it was argued by many that "internal" developments in Germany could not legitimately be made a reason for outside intervention. Similarly, while it is more and more evident that the activities of the "colonels' government" in Argentina threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere, many people in the United States strongly feel that, as long as that government has committed no overt act of war, intervention by Washington in what are described as Argentina's internal affairs would be unjustified, and ultimately harmful to our relations with Latin America.

UNO MACHINERY SHOULD BE USED. Sooner or later we must face the fact that, the more we expand the sphere of international cooperation, the more what happens in any country is of direct concern to every other country in the world. Hitherto, however, nations have not defined the acts or forms of conduct which the international community will not tolerate on the part of any of its members, and which would justify intervention. Such definition would of itself require admission, on the part of all nations, that national sovereignty can no longer be maintained in a rigid form. The transition period during which nations reassess the concept of sovereignty is bound to be painful and confusing. The wholesale intervention now going on in all quarters of the globe has at least the advantage of forcing all powers to face an issue too often beclouded in the past by confused thinking. So far as the United States is concerned, the question whether we should intervene or not is further confused by the ardor with which liberal groups who once opposed American intervention in Haiti and Nicaragua (and still oppose it in China) now urge it in Spain and Argentina. And, conversely, American conservatives who opposed intervention in Spain frequently urge it in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland.

If the objection to current interventions by Russia or Britain is their unilateral character, then the next step is to consider the possibility of international intervention. This concept is familiar, although more in theory than in practice, to the twenty-one nations of the Western Hemisphere; and there is every reason for its application by the UNO. Far from deploring, as some Americans are doing, the fact that the UNO, at this early stage of its existence, has been confronted with issues of the utmost seriousness, we should welcome this development. For it should be obvious, first, that these issues cannot be kept on ice until an undefined date when some one will declare the UNO open for other than procedural business; and, second, that if these issues are removed, even for a relatively brief period, from the jurisdiction of the UNO, and left to traditional dip-

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lomatic practices, we shall be weakening the newly created international organization instead of strengthening it. The UNO will wax strong by exercising its functions, not by evading them. It is only too easy to let the UNO become stunted through an

excessive diet of procedural matters. The sooner it starts working on real issues of international affairs, the more hope there can be of its ultimate effectiveness in settling them by peaceful means.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

GRAVE ECONOMIC ISSUES HARASS NEW FRENCH CABINET

Can Felix Gouin, elected interim President of France on January 23, succeed in maintaining the basic harmony that General de Gaulle failed to achieve among the "Big Three" of French politics—the Communists, Socialists and the more conservative Popular Republicans (MRP)? This is the question the French are anxiously asking themselves as the new coalition government formed by President Gouin plans drastic measures designed to provide adequate food rations and check the inflation that threatens the country.

Known as a mediator rather than as a leader, President Gouin is a conscientious rather than a colorful man who has been called "the Calvin Coolidge of France." He has spent much of his life as a small-town lawyer and worker in the local Socialist party, and his national reputation rests primarily on his wartime record as one of the lawyers who defended Léon Blum at the Riom war-guilt trials and as a member of de Gaulle's provisional government in Algiers. Since November he has presided over the National Constituent Assembly.

LEFT WINS VICTORY OVER DE GAULLE. The conflict between de Gaulle and the Assembly, which resulted on January 20 in at least temporary withdrawal of the General from the political scene, was basically a struggle between "the first resister" and the Communists, who emerged as the single largest party in the national elections of October 21. Although de Gaulle formed a tripartite government last November and declared his willingness to work with the Communists, he indicated that he would not permit them to hold any of the three principal posts in his cabinet. He succeeded in maintaining this position of ascendancy, however, only as long as he was able to count on the Socialists, with the aid of the MRP, to support him in carrying his proposals through the Assembly. Until January de Gaulle believed that the Socialists would continue to stand by him on crucial issues, or at least act as mediators between the Communists and the MRP.

On New Year's Day, however, the two Leftist parties joined in opposing de Gaulle's demands for a large military budget. In doing so, the Socialists and Communists were championing a popular cause, for French civilians have been gazing longingly at the food, clothing, gasoline and other supplies liberally allotted to the army at a time when the rest of the country is hungry and cold. Yet when de Gaulle threatened to resign if France were shorn of the

military power he considers essential for its prestige abroad, the Socialists backed down and arranged a compromise between the Communists and the General on army appropriations. This compromise was to expire in February, and de Gaulle feared the Socialists would then again join the Communists in requesting military reductions.

The second issue on which the Socialists agreed with the Communists was the role of the president in the Fourth Republic, whose constitution is now being drafted by the Constituent Assembly. The General believed that the traditional form of French government—in which parties and blocs predominated and a strong executive was mistrusted—should be replaced by a government in which the president enjoyed powers similar to those of the American chief executive. He hoped the Socialists as well as the MRP would support his view in opposition to that of the Communists, who advocated a strong legislature. During January, however, Socialist members of the Assembly's committee charged with drafting the new constitution joined the Communists in proposing that the legislative branch of the government be supreme. De Gaulle, concluding that the place of honor reserved for him as President of the proposed Fourth Republic was to be that of a mere figurehead, decided to reject it in advance.

WAS COMPROMISE IMPOSSIBLE? The validity of de Gaulle's belief that the Socialists had deserted him and formed an entente with the Communists, thus upsetting the balance among France's three major parties, is open to question. The Socialists have traditionally opposed strong executives. They have also opposed a large standing army, not only because of their conviction that money and manpower expended on the military could be more constructively spent on production of civilian goods, but because of fear that the army might be used in a Rightist *coup* against the Left. The mere fact, therefore, that the Socialists made common cause with the Communists on these two issues does not necessarily mean that they see eye-to-eye with the extreme Left on other outstanding questions, such as foreign policy and methods of carrying out major economic and social reforms. A political leader more capable of compromise than de Gaulle might have found it possible to accept Leftist victories on certain points, and then awaited a shift in political forces that would favor him on other issues.

Whether or not de Gaulle's resignation was precipitate, as even some of his strongest supporters in France are contending, there is little doubt that it has widened the chasm between the extreme Left and the more conservative elements in France. Moreover, de Gaulle's withdrawal has left the country without strong leadership—however much that leadership was contested by certain groups in the Assembly—at a moment when France faces problems which only a government capable of rallying widespread public support can handle. In an effort to curb inflation, President Gouin has suggested a series of deflationary measures similar to those proposed by Mendès-France, de Gaulle's former Minister of National Economy, who resigned a year ago when his stern financial proposals failed to win official endorsement. But the ability of the Gouin government to carry through a program calling for additional taxation, wage ceilings, and reduction of government subsidies used to prevent unemployment, at a time when bread is rationed and other daily necessities are almost non-existent, is far from assured.

U.S. AID ESSENTIAL. To some extent, the success or failure of the Gouin government's efforts to curb inflation will depend on the effectiveness of the "shock treatment," consisting of a series of official statements revealing new facts about the perilous

state of the national economy, which the cabinet is now giving the French people in an effort to gain public support for sweeping deflationary proposals. In striking contrast to de Gaulle's statement in his letter of resignation that "the nation is no longer in a state of alarm," the Gouin cabinet is bluntly declaring that the inflationary policies pursued by the General, whose main interest was in foreign affairs rather than domestic matters, have led France to the brink of financial disaster.

Any serious efforts to halt inflation will also have to secure Communist support if they are to be effective. But since the workers would be among the first to suffer from the deflation now being proposed by the Socialists, the Communists may be unwilling to endorse the proposals, particularly in view of the new elections scheduled to be held in May, when the Assembly has completed the constitution. Above all, France's success in carrying out stiff financial measures designed to put its economic affairs in order depends on the United States. By increasing shipments of food, raw materials and machinery, the United States could do much to tide the French over their present economic crisis, which might otherwise lead to the establishment of some form of authoritarian government.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

New Crops for the New World, edited by Charles Morrow Wilson. New York, Macmillan, 1945. \$3.50

A symposium by experts who write interestingly of new foods, fibers, and other types of crops developed to compensate for many products cut off by war in the Pacific.

Home to India, by Santha Rama Rau. New York, Harper, 1945. \$2.50

Thin in bulk, but far from thin in content, this is a delightful picture of the country and people, written with informed understanding.

The Gravediggers of France: Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud, Pétain, and Laval, by Pertinax (André Géraud). New York, Doubleday, 1944. \$6.00

By all standards, this is one of the most important books on the recent history of France. As one who knew all the outstanding French military and political leaders of the inter-war years, this world-famous journalist shows where and how disunity undermined the nation's powers of resistance and prepared the way for the Vichy régime and collaboration with the Nazis.

The Philippine Islands, by W. Cameron Forbes. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1945. \$5.00

Abridged to one volume and brought up to date by new material, this is a convenient edition of Governor-General Forbes' earlier, standard two-volume work of 1928. Sergio Osmeña, President of the Philippine Commonwealth; contributes a foreword.

Universal Military Training, by Col. Edward A. Fitzpatrick, AUS. New York, Whittlesey House, McGraw Hill, 1945. \$3.00

Although backing the War Department's plan for training during peace, the author also gives the opponents' side, thereby providing useful background for this much-discussed problem.

Nusantara—A History of the East Indian Archipelago, by Bernard H. M. Vlekke. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1944. \$5.00

Full of interesting facts about economic, social and political developments, Dr. Vlekke's readable and scholarly book surveys Indonesian history down to the Japanese conquest of 1942.

Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1931-1945, by Harriet L. Moore. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945. \$2.50

An excellent survey of a crucial sector of international relations, supplemented by valuable documentary appendices. In addition to using English-language materials, the author has made extensive use of Russian sources.

Netherlands India—A Study of Plural Economy, by J. S. Furnivall. New York, Macmillan, 1944. \$4.00

A valuable book because the British author, with admirable impartiality, analyzes Dutch problems in the light of his own experience in Burma. The economic analysis is presented with enough historical background to give a well-rounded picture.

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